Citation check of the typology working notes
Independent check of 2026-10-29-typology-notes.md against local Markdown texts and the web (how-to-research section 5). Read-only; the notes were not edited.
Citation check: typology working notes (pass 1)
Target: 2026-10-29-typology-notes.md. Method: how-to-research section 5. Pages are printed pages. "Local" = Markdown under ~/src/life-itself/library/books/<slug>/markdown/. "Web" = fetched copy in the session scratchpad.
Table
| # | Claim in notes | Source and page | Verdict | Where checked | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Olson's intermediate group defined by noticeability, not number; Olson "less pessimistic than asserted" | Ostrom p. 6 | CONFIRMED | Local, ostrom-governing-the-commons | none |
| 2 | Tragedy, PD and Olson all rest on free riding | Ostrom pp. 2-7 | CONFIRMED | Local (p. 6) | none |
| 3 | Alanya: annual lottery, daily rotation | Ostrom pp. 18-20 (notes also say 19-20) | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 4 | Appropriation vs providers/producers | Ostrom pp. 30-31 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 5 | "as much temptation to avoid contributing to the provision…" | Ostrom p. 32 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 6 | Firm/state: one person supplies rules, keeps residual, threats credible | Ostrom pp. 40-41 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 7 | Three puzzles; Bates: assurance easier than PD to supply; Elster nested dilemmas | Ostrom pp. 42-45 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 8 | "Without monitoring, there can be no credible commitment"; rules tempting to break later | Ostrom pp. 43-45 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 9 | "Appropriation problems … allocation of the flow; provision … the stock" | Ostrom p. 47 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 10 | Alanya "cannot be represented as a PD game"; "assignment" game; stealing/monitoring game has no single equilibrium | Ostrom p. 47 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 11 | CPR problems vary "depending on the values of underlying parameters" | Ostrom p. 47-48 | CONFIRMED | Local (wording is on pp. 46-47; p. 48 not needed) | cite pp. 46-47 |
| 12 | Open access "frequently … a PD"; limited access not a PD (Dasgupta and Heal p. 59) | Ostrom p. 48 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 13 | "unless appropriation problems are resolved, the provision problems may prove intractable"; no appropriation problem in a pure public good | Ostrom p. 49 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 14 | Chicken and assurance as better CPR models: "ch. 1 n. 2, p. 218, citing Runge and Taylor" | Ostrom p. 218 n. 2 | WRONG (half) | Local. n. 2 cites M. Taylor 1987 only. Runge (1981, 1984a), Taylor, and Taylor and Ward are cited in the text at pp. 46-47 | "p. 47 (Runge 1981, 1984a; Taylor 1987; Taylor and Ward 1982); ch. 1 n. 2, p. 218 (Taylor 1987)". The notes also put the text citation on p. 47; the sentence starts on p. 46 |
| 15 | Ostrom's axes: "physical good; rules in use; information" | Ostrom pp. 47, 49-50 | OVERSTATED | Local. She names the physical structure, technology, economic environment, rules in use, attributes of individuals (pp. 49-50). "Information" is not a named axis | Replace with "physical structure, technology, economic environment, rules in use" |
| 16 | Sanction accuracy 70% leaves herders in a PD (threshold 0.75) | Ostrom p. 11 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 17 | Alchian and Demsetz: "one cannot tell from an examination of outputs alone…" as summarised in Ostrom | Ostrom p. 221 n. 13 (ch. 2) | CONFIRMED | Local. The wording is Ostrom's paraphrase, not a quote from A&D | Say "Ostrom's paraphrase of" |
| 18 | O&R: "each game captures the essence of a type of strategic interaction" | O&R p. 15 | CONFIRMED | Local, osborne-rubinstein | none |
| 19 | PD: "unique Nash equilibrium (Confess, Confess)"; "free rider" | O&R pp. 16-17, Ex. 16.2, Fig. 17.1 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 20 | Coordination game quote about inferior equilibrium | O&R p. 16, Ex. 16.1 | CONFIRMED | Local. Calling it "the no-risk limit" of the stag hunt is the notes' reading, not O&R's | Mark as own gloss |
| 21 | Hawk-Dove: two equilibria, "conventions about the player who yields"; "also known as Chicken" | O&R pp. 16-17 (Ex. 16.3); p. 30 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 22 | War of attrition: "in all Nash equilibria one player concedes immediately" | O&R p. 18, "Example 18.4" | OVERSTATED | Local. That sentence is Exercise 18.5, for the pure-strategy game; mixed equilibria are not covered in ch. 2. Example 18.4 credits Maynard Smith 1974 (p. 30, confirmed) | Cite "Ex. 18.4 and Exercise 18.5 (pure-strategy equilibria)" |
| 23 | BoS: two pure equilibria, mixed ((2/3,1/3),(1/3,2/3)); payoffs (2/3,2/3) | O&R pp. 15-16, 34-35, 46 | CONFIRMED | Local. (2/3,2/3) is in Ex. 46.1; recomputed | none |
| 24 | Public coin gives a correlated equilibrium alternating between BoS equilibria | O&R p. 44 and Ex. 46.1 (payoff (3/2,3/2)) | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 25 | Evolutionary Hawk-Dove has a mixed ESS | O&R p. 49 Ex. 49.2 | OVERSTATED | Local. Result is on p. 50 and holds only if c > 1; if c < 1 the ESS is pure Hawk | "mixed ESS (1-1/c, 1/c) when c > 1, pp. 49-50" |
| 26 | Repeated PD: equilibrium set "is huge"; finite PD only (D,D) | O&R pp. 133-134 | CONFIRMED | Local. Both sentences are on p. 134 | cite p. 134 |
| 27 | Trigger-strategy folk theorem, punishment | O&R pp. 143-144 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 28 | Mechanism design: "we fix a set of outcomes and look for a game…" | O&R p. 177 | CONFIRMED | Local (ch. 10 opening) | none |
| 29 | O&R's coordination/Hawk-Dove "map onto" stag hunt and volunteer | O&R table row | CONFIRMED (as gloss) | Local. O&R do not make these mappings | none; keep labelled as the notes' mapping |
| 30 | L&M: principal delegates to a single agent; bargaining put aside | L&M pp. 13-14 | CONFIRMED | Local, laffont-martimort | none |
| 31 | L&M list adverse selection, moral hazard, nonverifiability; vol. II treats free riding among agents | L&M p. 14 | CONFIRMED | Local | none |
| 32 | Hume's meadow is the first free-rider statement (Hume 1740, p. 538); Wicksell; Clarke 1971 and Groves 1973 quote | L&M pp. 23-24 | CONFIRMED | Local. Quote exact | none |
| 33 | Hess and Ostrom: congestion, free riding (p. 4); "commodification or enclosure, pollution and degradation, and nonsustainability" (p. 5) | H&O pp. 4-5 | CONFIRMED | Local, hess-ostrom | none |
| 34 | "Knowledge is non-subtractable" so information commons are "almost pure building" | H&O p. 9 | OVERSTATED | Local. p. 9 says use of an idea does not subtract. p. 5 hedges ("traditionally relatively nonsubtractive"). p. 10 says capture can turn it into a CPR | "relatively non-subtractive in intangible form" |
| 35 | Taylor p. 18: "we should not equate … with the Prisoners' Dilemma" | Taylor p. 18 | CONFIRMED | Web (archive.org djvu text; page map from running heads) | none |
| 36 | Taylor counts assurance as not a collective action problem | Taylor pp. 19, 39 | CONFIRMED | Web | Note it is conditional on his rationality assumption (p. 19) |
| 37 | N-person PD when N > benefit/cost ratio | Taylor pp. 16-17 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 38 | Dyke quote ("either individual alone can do it all…") | Taylor pp. 36-37 (it is p. 36) | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 39 | Two factories on a small lake is chicken | Taylor p. 37 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 40 | "PD for Row, Chicken for Column" | Taylor p. 39, Fig. 5 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 41 | N-person PD supergame can be a Chicken game | Taylor p. 40 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 42 | N-person chicken G1-G3; G3 has an assurance subgame (stag hunt below, volunteer above) | Taylor pp. 41-43 | CONFIRMED | Web (G3 sub-game "is a game of Assurance", p. 42) | none |
| 43 | "in the rush to be among the first to make a commitment…"; "a little more promising" | Taylor p. 43 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 44 | Fishery tolerates two boats, not three | Taylor pp. 43-44 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 45 | "Committing to refuse is a weapon: whoever commits first wins" | Taylor pp. 39, 41-43 | OVERSTATED | Web. Taylor says there is an incentive to pre-commit, and p. 43 says the rush to commit can overshoot and cause non-provision | "the first credible committer gains, but the race to commit can overshoot (p. 43)" |
| 46 | Taylor's "axes": Pareto-inferiority, precommitment, lumpiness | Taylor chs. 1-2 | CONFIRMED (as criteria) | Web. These are his tests for what counts as a collective action problem plus the G1-G3 variants, not a typology | Say "criteria", not "axes" |
| 47 | Olson's privileged group; Taylor p. 35 | Taylor p. 35 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 48 | Heckathorn: five games; Rapoport-Guyer numbers #61, #6, #9, #66 | Heckathorn pp. 256-259, Table 2 (p. 258) | CONFIRMED | Web (scanned PDF read as page images, ndg.asc.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Heckathorn-1996.pdf). PD is #12 | none |
| 49 | Reversal recipe: reverse top payoffs gives assurance; bottom gives chicken; both gives privileged; middle gives altruist's dilemma | Heckathorn "p. 258, Table 2" | CONFIRMED | Web. Table is p. 258; the prose for assurance, privileged and altruist's dilemma is p. 259 | cite pp. 258-259 |
| 50 | "When the value of S increases until it exceeds the value of P, a PD is transformed into a chicken game"; decelerating production function | Heckathorn p. 258 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 51 | "The essential problem in a chicken game is bargaining" | Heckathorn p. 258 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 52 | Theorems 1-2: a dyadic good is a true PD only if F is not too decelerating (F < 1.58) and 1 < V/K < 2 | Heckathorn p. 258 | CONFIRMED | Web. Theorems are necessary conditions for a true PD, so "only if" is right. Note they are for dyadic groups | State "two-person" (notes do) |
| 53 | "Because individual and collective rationality coincide perfectly, there is no social dilemma" | Heckathorn p. 259 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 54 | Game-space: decelerating gives chicken, accelerating assurance; high value gives privileged, low gives altruist's dilemma (Fig. 2) | Heckathorn p. 257 | CONFIRMED | Web | none |
| 55 | Rapoport and Guyer: 78 strictly ordinal 2x2 games | Heckathorn p. 256 (cites Rapoport et al.); secondary | CONFIRMED | Web (Heckathorn p. 256, plus search results) | none |
| 56 | Robinson and Goforth 2005: "144 (counting relabelings)" | R&G 2005 | OVERSTATED | Web, secondary only. 78 is the count after identifying relabelings (12 symmetric + 66 pairs of asymmetric); 144 counts the row/column swaps separately | "144 games, or 78 up to swapping the players" |
| 57 | Kollock 1998, ARS 24: 183-214: PD, assurance, chicken; public goods and commons dilemmas | Kollock abstract | CONFIRMED | Web, abstract only (arch.neicon.ru; search snippet) | none |
| 58 | Kollock's solutions: motivational, strategic, structural (notes mark [?]) | Kollock abstract | CONFIRMED | Web, abstract | Drop the [?] for this item; sections and pages still unchecked |
| 59 | Kollock axes "two vs many; give vs take" | Kollock | UNVERIFIED | Abstract gives two-person vs multi-person and public goods vs commons; "give vs take" not seen | Keep [?] |
| 60 | "greed" and "fear" are standard terms (Macy and Flache 2002; Coombs 1973; Dawes 1980) | Macy and Flache PNAS 99 suppl. 3 | OVERSTATED | Web (PMC128590). Macy and Flache do use greed (T > R) and fear (P > S). They do not cite Coombs 1973; they cite Dawes 1980 only for "social dilemmas" | Cite Macy and Flache 2002 only; Coombs and Dawes stay [?] |
| 61 | Volunteer's dilemma model; symmetric mixed equilibrium; nobody-acts probability rises with n toward K/U | Diekmann 1985, p. 607 | CONFIRMED (secondary) | Web, secondary papers cite Diekmann 1985 p. 607 for p = 1-(c/b)^(1/(n-1)) and for the rising no-volunteer probability. Original not read. Also recomputed | none; keep [?] on the original |
| 62 | Hirshleifer 1983 introduced summation, weakest-link, best-shot | Public Choice 41: 371-386 | CONFIRMED (bibliographic) | Web abstract | Mapping to PD/stag hunt/chicken stays UNVERIFIED (see 70) |
| 63 | "If R < P, there is no dilemma: deadlock" | Heckathorn p. 259 (deadlock = T > P > R > S) | OVERSTATED | Games check. R < P is not a dilemma, but deadlock names one ordering; other orderings with R < P exist | "If R < P, no dilemma (e.g. deadlock, T > P > R > S)" |
| 64 | "greed/fear 2x2 plus deadlock covers every symmetric case with strict preferences" | notes | OVERSTATED | Games check. Enumerating the 12 strict orderings with R > P gives 1 + 3 + 3 + 5 across the four cells, so the greed/fear grid is exhaustive for R > P. The R < P orderings are more than deadlock | Say "the four cells cover every strict symmetric ordering with R > P; R < P are non-dilemmas" |
Unverified (no local or fetched text; notes already mark most with [?])
| # | Claim | Verdict | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 65 | Olson 1965: privileged / intermediate / latent, pp. 49-52; "exploitation of the great by the small" | UNVERIFIED | Only second-hand (Ostrom p. 6, Taylor p. 35, Heckathorn p. 259, all confirmed). Notes already [?] |
| 66 | Hardin 1982 as n-person PD | UNVERIFIED | Ostrom n. 2 (p. 218) says "Hardin's model easily translates into the prisoner's dilemma structure": that is Garrett Hardin 1968, not Russell Hardin 1982. Check which is meant |
| 67 | Sandler 1992 aggregation to pattern mapping; Dixit-Skeath chapter; Ullmann-Margalit three norm types; Schelling 1978 ch. 7; Marwell and Oliver 1993 | UNVERIFIED | Not read; the Hirshleifer abstract supports only that weakest-link softens and best-shot worsens underprovision |
| 68 | Holmström 1982 team result; Alchian and Demsetz 1972 at first hand; Bliss and Nalebuff 1984; Darley and Latané 1968 | UNVERIFIED | Notes [?] |
| 69 | Van Huyck et al. 1990; Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Bagnoli and Lipman 1989; Tabarrok 1998; Buterin, Hitzig, Weyl 2019; Heller 1998; Barrett; Lansing; Andreoni 1995; Green and Laffont 1979; Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Schelling 1960; Lewis 1969; Klein, Crawford, Alchian 1978 | UNVERIFIED | All marked [?] in the notes; none checked |
| 70 | Sandler/Hirshleifer mapping: summation to battle line, weakest link to stag hunt, best shot to volunteer | UNVERIFIED | Plausible, standard, but not checked against Sandler |
Game-theory check (matrices and equilibria)
Recomputed each matrix. All ordinal payoffs match the stated orderings and all equilibria are right.
- PD (T > R > P > S): D strictly dominates; unique (D,D); no mixed equilibrium. Correct.
- Stag hunt (4/1/3/2 as R/S/T/P): equilibria (stag,stag) and (hare,hare); mixed at 1/2 with these numbers (3p+1 = p+2). Correct. Chapter 1 numbers (4,4 / 0,3 / 3,0 / 3,3): mixed at stag 3/4; hare is risk-dominant (deviation losses 1 vs 3). Correct. Note that the 1/2 uses the ordinal numbers as cardinal; the notes say "with these numbers".
- Chicken (3,3 / 2,4 / 4,2 / 1,1): equilibria (C,D), (D,C); mixed 1/2 each (p+2 = 3p+1); crash probability 1/4. Correct.
- Volunteer, n = 2, U = 4, K = 1: matrix is T > R = S > P, not strictly ordinal (tie R = S), as the notes say. Pure equilibria: exactly one volunteer. Mixed: q = (K/U)^(1/(n-1)); n = 2 gives q = 1/4 and nobody-acts 1/16; n = 10 gives q = 0.857 and nobody-acts 0.214; limit K/U = 0.25. All correct, and consistent with Diekmann as described by secondary sources.
- Pure coordination: mixed 1/2. Mozart/Mahler (2,2 / 1,1 / 0 off-diagonal): Mozart with probability 1/3. Correct and matches O&R Fig. 16.2.
- BoS: mixed ((2/3,1/3),(1/3,2/3)), payoffs (2/3,2/3), below both pure equilibria. Correct and matches O&R Ex. 34.1 and Ex. 46.1.
- Deadlock (T > P > R > S) and harmony (R > T > S > P): D dominates in deadlock, C in harmony. Correct; both match Heckathorn Table 2 orderings.
- Greed/fear grid: PD = greed and fear; chicken = greed only; stag hunt = fear only; harmony = neither. Correct for R > P. The "no greed, no fear" cell holds five orderings (including S > R), all with C dominant or no dilemma, so "harmony" is a fair label.
- One more check: the notes' Hawk-Dove ESS remark (row 25) and the war-of-attrition remark (row 22) are the only game-theory statements stated without their conditions.
Check depth (summary)
Ostrom, O&R, Laffont and Martimort, and Hess and Ostrom claims were checked page by page against the local Markdown (page markers used; O&R's marker for printed p. 177 is a chapter-opening "p. 10 | pdf 193" and was resolved from the neighbouring pdf numbers). Taylor 1987 was checked against a full-text archive.org copy (all cited pages located via running heads; the PDF text layer is OCR). Heckathorn 1996 pp. 256-259 were read as page images of the scanned PDF; the rest of the article was not read. Kollock 1998, Macy and Flache 2002 (full text via PMC), Diekmann 1985, Hirshleifer 1983, Rapoport and Guyer and Robinson and Goforth were checked only from abstracts, a full text for Macy and Flache, or secondary sources, as stated per row. The remaining sources (Olson, Sandler, Dixit and Skeath, Ullmann-Margalit, Schelling, Marwell and Oliver, Holmström, Alchian and Demsetz at first hand, and the cited economics papers) were not checked and stay [?]. The matrices and equilibria were recomputed independently.
Recheck, 30 Oct (local books)
Unverified rows rechecked against newly converted local texts (Olson 1965, 5th printing; Sandler 1992 and 2004; Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 4th ed.; Schelling 1978 ch. 7, Google Books page map). Details in the notes' "Recheck (30 Oct)" paragraph.
| # | Was | Now |
|---|---|---|
| 61 | Diekmann model confirmed only from secondary sources | Model and group-size result also in Dixit, Skeath and Reiley pp. 455–457 (after Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984). Diekmann's original still unread |
| 65 | Olson unverified | CONFIRMED: privileged / intermediate / latent pp. 49–51; "exploitation" of the great by the small pp. 3, 29, 35 |
| 66 | Which Hardin? | Russell Hardin 1982, p. 25, as quoted by Sandler 1992 p. 44 ("essentially the same"). Second-hand only |
| 67 | Sandler, Dixit, Schelling unverified | Dixit CONFIRMED (pp. 418–430). Schelling CONFIRMED in substance (GB-map pp. 216–242), but he does not use the names chicken or assurance. Ullmann-Margalit, Marwell and Oliver still unverified |
| 68 | Holmström unverified | Second-hand via Sandler 1992 p. 125. Alchian–Demsetz, Bliss–Nalebuff and Darley–Latané still unverified |
| 70 | Sandler mapping unverified | WRONG in part: Sandler's best shot is a "Coordination" (BoS-like) game, not chicken (1992 p. 41; 2004 p. 66, Table 3.2 p. 68). Its payoffs (T > R = S > P) do fit the volunteer. Summation gives PD or chicken; weakest link and threshold give assurance |
