Check of the new knowledge-base pages (30 Oct)
Independent check-and-fix pass on the typology wiki pages against the recheck notes and local texts. Log of changes.
Check of the new knowledge-base pages (30 Oct)
Checked against 2026-10-29-typology-notes.md (incl. the 30 Oct recheck), 2026-10-29-typology-citation-check.md, and local texts in ~/src/life-itself/library/books/ (all quoted excerpts re-found by phrase search with page markers: Ostrom, O&R, Laffont and Martimort, Olson, Sandler 1992 and 2004, Dixit, Skeath and Reiley). Taylor and Heckathorn rest on the earlier web check. Matrices and equilibria recomputed: all correct; two prose descriptions of which cells differ were wrong (below). Moloch checked on the web (Slate Star Codex, 30 July 2014). Snowdrift alias sourced to Doebeli and Hauert 2005 (bibliographic check only).
| Page | Issue | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Aggregation technologies | Said Sandler unread; mapping [?]; implied Sandler maps best shot to volunteer | Rewritten: Sandler's labels (summation → PD or chicken, 1992 pp. 40–41, 2004 p. 62; best shot → "coordination", BoS-like, 1992 p. 41, 2004 p. 66; weakest link → assurance, 1992 pp. 43–44, 2004 pp. 62–64; threshold → assurance, 2004 p. 64; Table 3.2 p. 68) in their own column, ours beside. Threshold-above = volunteer credited to Taylor. [?] dropped except Marwell and Oliver |
| Aggregation technologies | Schelling curves [?] | Cited to ch. 7 without [?] |
| Patterns of collective action | Aggregation bullet stated our mapping as fact | Replaced with Sandler's mapping, volunteer as payoff-order reading |
| Patterns of collective action | Allocation stated as the chicken fix without condition | Qualified: only where one actor is enough (Dixit et al. p. 449) |
| Patterns of collective action | Olson "known through Ostrom"; Hirshleifer/Sandler [?] | Olson pp. 49–51; Sandler 1992 pp. 36–44, 2004 pp. 61–68; Dixit et al. p. 418 added |
| Patterns of collective action | "Ostrom makes the same point" — she reports others (Runge, Taylor) | Reworded; attribution line says "summarizing Runge and Taylor" |
| Patterns of collective action | Group-size claim uncited; length | Dixit et al. pp. 455–457, p. 430 added; slogan sentence and lead-in cut |
| Names of collective action problems | "Social trap", "trust dilemma" unsourced | Dropped; note that "social dilemma" is an umbrella term (Kollock 1998) |
| Names of collective action problems | Snowdrift, Hawk–Dove unsourced in table | Doebeli and Hauert 2005; O&R p. 30 |
| Names of collective action problems | Best-shot = volunteer stated as economics alias | Labelled as Sandler's "coordination" game with our payoff reading |
| Names of collective action problems | Olson [?]; privileged group = harmony overstated | Olson pp. 49–50 "roughly"; note on n. 70 (p. 50) |
| Names of collective action problems | R. Hardin [?] | Second-hand via Sandler 1992 p. 44 |
| Names of collective action problems | Ostrom n. 2 cited p. 218 | pp. 217–218 (note starts on p. 217) |
| Names of collective action problems | Moloch [?] | Verified; date added, [?] dropped |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | "Social trap" alias | Dropped |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | Assurance "makes defecting more tempting" (overstated) | "Defecting still pays more" |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | Montreal Protocol missing | Added as privileged-group move (Sandler 2004 pp. 217–218); Dixit p. 430 "almost always" added |
| Stag hunt (new sections) | "Trust dilemma" unsourced | Dropped |
| Chicken (game) | Allocation as universal fix | Qualified; Dixit et al. p. 449 rotation excerpt added |
| Chicken (game) | Snowdrift unsourced; Sandler's summation route missing | Doebeli and Hauert 2005; Sandler 2004 p. 62 |
| Volunteer's dilemma | Model "standard form" only, Diekmann [?] | Model page-cited to Dixit et al. pp. 455–457 (after Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984); excerpt p. 457; Diekmann still [?] |
| Volunteer's dilemma | "Best-shot goods are volunteer's dilemmas" | Qualified with Sandler's label |
| Greed and fear | "Refund if you contribute alone" removes fear and gives a volunteer's dilemma — wrong example (refunds belong to threshold goods) | Now: refund removes fear from a stag hunt, contributing becomes dominant (Sandler 2004 p. 64) |
| Chicken vs prisoner's dilemma | Said the "top-right cell" is the same and the "bottom-left pair" differs — wrong cells | Left column same (greed); right column differs (1 < 2 vs 2 > 1) |
| Chicken vs prisoner's dilemma | Allocation fix unqualified; assurance overstated | Qualified (Dixit p. 449); "not digging still pays more" |
| Prisoner's dilemma vs stag hunt | Said "bottom row matches" and "top two payoffs" differ — wrong cells | Right column matches (fear); left column differs; "top two in the ranking" for Heckathorn |
| Stag hunt vs chicken | Fix row unsourced/unqualified | Dixit et al. p. 445 (focal point) and p. 449 |
| Principal-agent problem | Holmström [?] | Second-hand via Sandler 1992 p. 125 |
| Second-order free-rider problem | Tresas "excluded from office" not in Xenophon 9; Polybius book only | "Shunned in the messes, in games and in marriage"; Polybius 6.37 |
| Collective action bibliography | Dixit with McAdams, unread | 4th ed. 2015 with Reiley; pages read; McAdams noted as later editions |
| Collective action bibliography | Sandler 1992 "best shot to chicken", unread; Sandler 2004 missing | Corrected mapping with pages; Sandler 2004 entry added |
| Collective action bibliography | Olson, Schelling 1978 "not yet read"; Diekmann, Hirshleifer, R. Hardin depth | Read-depth and pages updated; Schelling's labels noted as Dixit's mapping; Doebeli and Hauert added |
| Game theory basics | One-line link | No change needed |
Confirmed without change: O&R pp. 15–17, 30, 34–35, 44, 46, 134; Ostrom pp. 11, 30–31, 40–49, 221; Laffont and Martimort pp. 13–14, 23; Hess and Ostrom pp. 4–5, 9–10; Taylor and Heckathorn as in the earlier citation check.
